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This text is a fragment of the article Marxism and ethical socialism, which will be published in Dialektika: Journal of Philosophical Research and Social Theory in its Issue 4, Volume 2. The full version can be consulted in a few days at the following address: https://journal.dialektika.org/ojs/index.php/logos/article/view/23
Absrtact: One of the principal legacies of analytical Marxism has been a moralization of Marxism, for some of the most influential analytical Marxists came to endorse the view that the Marxist condemnation of capitalism and defense of socialism ultimately derive from normative ethical considerations. If we accept this new interpretation of Marx and Marxism, with its emphasis on the moral foundations of Marxist doctrine, we are forced to reconsider the relationship between Marxism and another socialist tradition for which moral commitments are also fundamental, namely ethical socialism. If our reconsideration of this relationship avoids common misconceptions about ethical socialism (such as the idea that it implies reformism, or that it is identical to “utopian socialism”), we find that the dichotomy between ethical socialism and Marxist socialism proves untenable, at least in the terms in which it has usually been formulated.
Keywords: Marxism, ethical socialism, Roy Edgley, utopian socialism, Norman Geras.
INTRODUCTION
There seems to be little doubt that the principal legacy of analytical Marxism—leaving aside the wholly negative contribution, as it were, resulting from the analytical Marxists’ vigorous criticism and dismissal of many basic Marxist theses—has been an unabashed moralization of Marxism.[1] That is to say, few would deny that, so far as the interpretation of Marx and Marxism are concerned, the most notable, lasting effect of this movement has been an insistence on and vindication of the normative moral dimensions of Marxist doctrine. This is evident in many of the contributions to specific debates on the moral status of Marx’s thought, as well as in a number of the texts that aim at a broader, more synthetic and systematic analysis of Marx and the Marxist tradition. A good example of the latter is furnished by Jon Elster’s conclusion to his Making Sense of Marx (1985), which vividly evokes the legacy to which I am referring:
“It is not possible today, morally or intellectually, to be a Marxist in the traditional sense. … But…I believe it is still possible to be a Marxist in a rather different sense of the term. I find that most of the views that I hold to be true and important, I can trace back to Marx. This includes methodology, substantive theories and, above all, values. The critique of exploitation and alienation remains central” (p. 531; emphasis in the original).
Yet, while most commentators would probably accept the above characterization of analytical Marxism’s legacy, few have considered what is, to my mind, an obvious and important implication of this development, namely, that it tends to decisively undermine the distinction—long accepted by the vast majority of Marxists—between Marxist socialism and ethical socialism.[2] In other words, to the extent that we endorse this moralization of Marxism, the familiar claim that Marxist socialism is fundamentally opposed to ethical socialism becomes untenable.
That this conclusion is unavoidable, without being the least bit undesirable (at least from a Marxist perspective), is the claim that I set out to defend in the remainder of this paper.
My essay has five sections, apart from the introduction. I begin by briefly reviewing the various meanings and uses of the term “ethical socialism” and also provide the definition of ethical socialism that I shall be using. The following section of the paper then canvasses five common misconceptions, or unwarranted assumptions, regarding ethical socialism. In section three of the paper, I argue that if we employ the definition of ethical socialism that I have proposed, avoid the errors discussed in section two and accept the view that Marxism condemns capitalism and advocates socialism partly (or entirely) on moral grounds, then the dichotomy between ethical socialism and Marxist socialism proves untenable, at least in the terms in which it has usually been formulated. In this section, I also discuss two claims often used in support of the standard counterposition of ethical socialism and Marxism. The fourth section of the essay briefly addresses an objection, advanced by some Marxists, to an interpretation of Marxism that makes normative moral commitments central to and the foundation of the Marxist outlook. The paper then concludes with some reflections on the implications of adopting the interpretation of Marxism that foregrounds the doctrine’s moral dimension.
I
What, exactly, is “ethical socialism”?[3] Given the frequency with which this term has appeared in Marxist literature, it is natural to assume that the term has a determinate meaning. In fact, the term “ethical socialism”—which was not current in Marx’s time and, to my knowledge, was not employed by Marx and Engels themselves—has been, and continues to be, used to designate a number of different, sometimes quite divergent, theoretical and political positions. For example, the term “ethical socialism” is sometimes used as a rough synonym for what Marxists have conventionally referred to as “utopian socialism,” that is, the emancipatory projects developed by Owen, Saint-Simon, and Fourier. Then again, “ethical socialism” sometimes refers to Eduard Bernstein’s “revisionist” version of Marxism developed at the end of the nineteenth century. (Indeed, the term apparently first gained currency as a result of the debates and polemics occasioned by Bernstein’s work.) At the same time, the term “ethical socialism” is also often used to identify the early twentieth-century movement in philosophy that sought to fashion a kind of neo-Kantian Marxism. Finally, the phrase “ethical socialism” is also sometimes used to characterize or evoke the politics associated with a tradition within British socialism, the best-known exponent of which was doubtless R. H. Tawney.[4]
It should be clear, even from this extremely brief summary, that the term “ethical socialism” has been used quite broadly. But this is hardly surprising, considering that writers who avail themselves of the term seldom take the trouble to define it. For our present purposes, I think we would do well to adopt a definition offered by Roy Edgley: “the political tendency that advocates socialism as centrally involving, even based on, a set of ethical or moral values, values that are perhaps distinctively socialist” (1990, p. 21).[5] I find this definition especially well-suited for my aims in the present essay not only because it covers the different varieties of ethical socialism already noted, but also because Edgely was himself both a Marxist and dismissive of ethical socialism. In any event, once we have accepted a definition along these lines, the question then becomes: What follows from such a conception of ethical socialism? Or rather: Does it entail anything that a Marxist should necessarily object to?
Notes
[1] I borrow the concept of a “moralized Marxism” from Kai Nielsen (1989), p. 272.
[2] For a study that does examine some aspects of this development, yet without analyzing the nature of ethical socialism, see Roberts (1996), chapter 7.
[3] Given the aims of this essay, I do not think it necessary to offer a precise definition of socialism. But I would argue that Tom Bottomore is correct in characterizing socialism, in very general terms, as “a social order in which there is the maximum feasible equality of access, for all human beings, to economic resources, to knowledge, and to political power, and the minimum possible domination exercised by any individual or social group over any others” (as cited in Self, 1993, p. 343).
[4] I do not mean to suggest that this list is by any means exhaustive, but I would argue that it does cover the most important uses of the term.
[5] Cf. the definition of ethical socialism proposed by Peter Self (1993): “the belief that socialism must be founded upon and reflect the acceptable moral principles of a good society” (p. 337). A much more idiosyncratic definition of ethical socialism is provided by Norman Dennis and A. H. Halsey (1988): “Ethical socialism is a radical tradition which makes heroic claims on people and on the society that nurtures them. It offers both a code of conduct for individuals and a guide to social reform aimed at creating optimal conditions for the highest possible moral attainment of every person” (p. 1).
