Source: JFPP | June 6, 2019
Illustration by Olga Khaletskaya
Enactivism and French Phenomenology
Enactivism is an influential research field in the philosophy of mind, which has dynamically developed and gained global importance since the early 1990s (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991). Although there exist different versions of enactivism (see, Ward et al. 2017 for an overview), in general, it defines cognition concerning interactions with physical and social surroundings (e.g., Varela et al. 1991, O’Regan and Noë 2001, Noë 2004, Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017).
Initially, that concept found its origins in cognitive science and phenomenology, in particular in Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of the embodied consciousness. Despite phenomenology’s influence within the field of enactivism, new theories of enactivism rarely investigate in depth the works of phenomenologists, and there is in particular still room for an investigation between enactivism and French phenomenologists, such as Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas or Michel Henry.
There exist several articles in the secondary literature that connects enactivism to French phenomenology, for example, Wider (2015) on Sartre, De Jaegher (2015) on Henry and Dierckxsens (2018) on Ricoeur. A special issue dedicated entirely to the relation between enactivism and (French) phenomenology does not exist so far.
This is surprising since enactivism seems especially close to the French branch of 20th-century phenomenology, which, following Merleau-Ponty’s idea of “flesh” emphasizes the idea that existence is a dynamic embodied interaction with physical and social surroundings.
About the Special Issue
This issue of The Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy invites contributions that examine the relations between enactivism and phenomenology, in particular, the works of 20th-century French phenomenologists.
This issue aims to investigate whether and how enactivism and French phenomenology share theoretical insights or whether they conflict with each other.
For example, does enactivism’ critical attitude towards representationalism stand in line with a phenomenological concept of existentialism, understood as a theory of freedom and responsibility based on interactions with culture? Moreover, can phenomenology offer specific undeveloped ideas into contemporary enactivist ideas, such as the idea that embodied subjectivity relates to moral agency?
This issue invites papers that address these and similar questions by engaging in an in-depth analysis of both enactivism and the work(s) of one or more phenomenologists, in particular, French phenomenologists (Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Ricoeur, Henry, Levinas, and others). Although the main focus of this issue is on French phenomenology, we also welcome papers relating enactivism to other historical developments of phenomenology, for example, to Husserl.
If interested in publishing in this issue, please send a full paper on the topic to Geoffrey Dierckxsens ([email protected] by December 15, 2019. Papers will be subject to a blind review process. For stylistic instructions, please see the journal’s website: Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy (JFFP)
About the Journal
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy (JFFP) is an open-access, peer-reviewed electronic academic journal dedicated to the study of French and French-speaking thought. Although rooted in philosophy, it also promotes collaborations and interdisciplinary explorations inspired by philosophical thought. It has a biannual frequency.
The journal accepts collaborations in English and French.
