In his first year back at the White House, Donald Trump has taken a profound turn in U.S. foreign policy. His style –quick decisions, blunt messages, and an execution that often borders on institutional limits– has shifted priorities and put back at the center of the debate ideas that seemed already settled. Among them is the logic of spheres of influence, a nineteenth-century concept that has reemerged in new forms.
Trump has openly embraced the Monroe Doctrine, which in the nineteenth century held that the Western Hemisphere should remain free of European interference. The president has renamed it the “Donroe Doctrine,” an amplified version that presents the United States as the sole guarantor of security in the Americas. This idea connects to a broader framework: a world divided into large spaces dominated by regional powers.
His decisions and declarations have not only altered U.S. external action but also forced other international actors to constantly respond to shifts in Washington’s course. Under this logic, the world is organized into areas of influence, and the United States –as “hegemon” of the Western Hemisphere– would have legitimacy to act freely within its region.
Spheres of Influence: From Schmitt to China
This notion is reminiscent of the “great space” (Großraum) formulated by the German philosopher Carl Schmitt, who argued that the international order is organized around great powers that exercise influence over entire regions.
Even though Schmitt is a controversial figure due to his ties with Nazism, his theory has been indirectly reappropriated by some Chinese intellectuals to explain the country’s rise and its role in the Asia-Pacific region. Recent studies examine how China articulates its influence through investment, diplomacy, and military presence in its region.
This approach also calls into question the thesis advanced by the political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who, in the 1990s, argued that the fall of the USSR marked the “end of history” and the definitive victory of liberalism. The evolution of China, Russia, and now the United States instead points to a return to competition among great powers.
The American vision was articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy, which divides the world into blocs: the United States in the Western Hemisphere, Russia in its immediate vicinity, and China in the Asia-Pacific region.
The document represents a rupture with the postwar liberal order, based on universal rules and multilateral institutions, and favors a more territorial and hierarchical logic.
From Monroe to “Donroe”: Hemispheric Exclusivity in 21st Century Terms
Trump’s foreign policy has operated along similar lines to China’s, though on different grounds. Two recent episodes illustrate this logic: the American intervention in Venezuela and the interest in the possible purchase or annexation of Greenland under the pretext of national security. Both cases rest on the premise that the United States has the right to act freely within its area of influence.
The political viability of the “Donroe Doctrine” will be measured in the midterm elections
But those are not the only examples: over the past year, there have been further actions, such as the attacks against alleged drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean, pressure on Panama over the management of the canal that Trump wants to take back, new sanctions on Nicaragua and even stricter restrictions on Cuba, or the strengthening of his relationship with El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele in exchange for cooperation on migration matters.
All of these actions respond to the same idea: that the United States has the right to act freely within its area of influence and to impede the strategic presence of external powers. The “Donroe Doctrine” formalizes this vision and turns it into the core of American foreign policy.
The Clash Between the International Agenda and Domestic Expectations
However, this foreign strategy cannot be understood without looking inward. The dialectic of Trump’s administration stands in contrast to the priorities of many of the voters who brought him to the White House in 2024. His support was built on a clear diagnosis: the previous administrations had betrayed the average American.
According to the president’s rhetoric, globalization deindustrialized the country, widened social gaps, and strengthened strategic rivals. The elites –both Republican and Democratic– would have ignored these issues, thus causing the impoverishment of the ordinary citizen.
For this reason, the political viability of the “Donroe Doctrine” will be measured in the midterm elections. Trump controls the three branches of government, but his majority in the House of Representatives is extraordinarily narrow –the most exiguous in almost a century. The success of his international agenda will only be judged positively if voters perceive improvements in their quality of life. If the economy suffers or purchasing power falls, the fruits of that attempt to reorder the international system will have to be sought elsewhere.
In the meantime, it is worth following those who have conceptually analyzed this shift – among them American writer and economist Benn Steil – to understand a change that, for the first time in decades, is not only limited to rhetoric but also reconfigures the real distribution of power.
Text published by The Conversation.
